Lecture #17: Validity Rollups

COMS 4995-001: The Science of Blockchains URL: https://timroughgarden.org/s25/

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Recall: "Classic" Rollups

"Classic" rollup: a blockchain/virtual machine with its own state

- not necessarily decentralized, subject to crash or Byzantine failure
- performs its own consensus (i.e., tx sequencing) and execution
- associated with smart contract(s) running on the L1
- publishes rollup txs via L1 contract (i.e., uses L1 for data availability)
 - note: anyone can run a rollup full node (i.e., maintain full rollup state)
- periodically publishes commitment to rollup state (e.g. state root) to L1
 - note: any full node can check correctness of commitment
- (hard part) state commitment correctness verified by L1
 - question: how can L1 do this without re-executing rollup txs itself?

L1 \III Rollup Architecture



Goals for Lecture #17

- 1. Validity rollups. (e.g., Starknet, zkSync)
 - rollup state commitments verified by L1 using "SNARK" proofs
 - cryptographic (rather than cryptoeconomic) security
- 2. Probabilistic verification.
 - need verification of correct tx execution << actual tx execution
 - example: matrix multiplication (Freivalds' algorithm)

3. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic.

- non-manipulable randomness from cryptographic hash functions
- "flattens" an iterative/interactive computation into a single proof

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Drawbacks:

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- "1 in N" trust assumption for watchdogs
- attacks preventing honest challengers from submitting L1 txs
- delay (≈ 7 days) before finalization of a state commitment
 users can proceed on basis of "preconfirmation," if desired

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- L1 verifies proof of correctness directly
 - state commitment rejected if accompanying proof fails verification 14

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Hard part: verification of correctness proofs should be *much* easier than tx re-execution --- i.e., need "SNARKs."

Matrix Multiplication

Matrix Multiplication

Let's drill down on the n = 2 case. We can describe two 2×2 matrices using eight parameters:



In the matrix product $\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$, the upper-left entry is the dot product of the first row of \mathbf{X} and the first column of \mathbf{Y} , or ae + bg. In general, for \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{Y} as above,

$$\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{Y} = \begin{bmatrix} ae + bg & af + bh \\ ce + dg & cf + dh \end{bmatrix}.$$
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Figure 3.2: The (i, j) entry of the matrix product $\mathbf{X} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$ is the dot product of the *i*th row of \mathbf{X} and the *j*th column of \mathbf{Y} .

Matrix Multiplication (con'd)

Note: can compute the product of two $n \times n$ matrices in $O(n^3)$ time.

- n^2 dot products, O(n) time for each

Straightforward Matrix Multiplication

Input: $n \times n$ integer matrices X and Y. Output: $Z = X \cdot Y$.

 $\begin{array}{ll} \mbox{for } i := 1 \mbox{ to } n \mbox{ do } & // \mbox{ loop over rows of } \mathbf{X} \\ \mbox{ for } j := 1 \mbox{ to } n \mbox{ do } & // \mbox{ loop over columns of } \mathbf{Y} \\ \mathbf{Z}[i][j] := 0 \\ \mbox{ for } k := 1 \mbox{ to } n \mbox{ do } & // \mbox{ compute dot product } \\ \mathbf{Z}[i][j] := \mathbf{Z}[i][j] + \mathbf{X}[i][k] \cdot \mathbf{Y}[k][j] \\ \mbox{ return } \mathbf{Z} \end{array}$

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- running time = $O(n^3)$
- or $O(n^{2.37})$ with the asymptotically best known (but hopelessly impractical) matrix multiplication algorithm

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$$y_i \coloneqq C \cdot x_i$$

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 - choose $x_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random, compute $y_i \coloneqq C \cdot x_i$ and $z_i \coloneqq A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$ - if $y_i \neq z_i$, return "no"
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Example:
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
, $B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$, $C = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$

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- for $x \in \{(0,1), (1,1)\}$: $C \cdot x = (1,0)$

- for i = 1,2,...,t:
 - choose x_i ∈ {0,1}ⁿ uniformly at random, compute y_i ≔ C · x_i and z_i ≔ A · (B · x_i)
 if y_i ≠ z_i, return "no"
- return "yes"

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- for all $x \in \{(0,0), (1,0), (0,1), (1,1)\}$: $A \cdot (B \cdot x) = (0,0)$
- for $x \in \{(0,0), (1,0)\}$: $C \cdot x = (0,0)$
- for $x \in \{(0,1), (1,1)\}$: $C \cdot x = (1,0)$

- upshot: $C \cdot x \neq A \cdot (B \cdot x)$ with 50% probability (over choice of x)

- for i = 1,2,...,t:
 - choose $x_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random, compute $y_i \coloneqq C \cdot x_i$ and $z_i \coloneqq A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$
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Running time analysis:

- for i = 1,2,...,t:
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Running time analysis:

- t iterations
- three matrix-vector products per iteration ($O(n^2)$ time each)
- overall running time = $O(t \cdot n^2)$

- for i = 1,2,...,t:
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Correctness [case 1]: suppose $C = A \cdot B$.

- for every $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, $C \cdot x = A \cdot (B \cdot x)$
- algorithm guaranteed to (correctly) return "yes"
 - i.e., no false negatives

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Correctness [case 2]: suppose $C \neq A \cdot B$.

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- \rightarrow algorithm (correctly) returns "no" except with $\leq 2^{-t}$ probability
 - i.e., false positive probability $\leq 2^{-t}$

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- $C \cdot x \neq A \cdot (B \cdot x) \Leftrightarrow M \cdot x \neq 0$, where $M \coloneqq C A \cdot B$
- let j be index of non-zero column of M (exists because $C \neq A \cdot B$)

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- note: if x, x' differ only in jth coordinate, $M \cdot x \neq M \cdot x'$

 $-M \cdot (x - x') = \pm jth$ column of M

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- \rightarrow either $M \cdot x \neq 0$ or $M \cdot x' \neq 0$ (or both)
- \rightarrow number of x's with $M \cdot x = 0 \le$ number of x's with $M \cdot x \ne 0$

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- \rightarrow number of x's with $M \cdot x = 0 \le$ number of x's with $M \cdot x \ne 0$
- \Rightarrow $M \cdot x \neq 0$ with probability $\geq \frac{1}{2}$ over choice of $x \in \{0,1\}^n$

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Upshot: can verify correctness of matrix multiplication in $O(n^2)$ time with arbitrarily small constant error.

- cf., "recompute from scratch" algorithm that takes $O(n^3)$ (or $O(n^{2.37})$) time

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Idea: post C along with $x_1, x_2, ..., x_t$. [assume L1 knows A and B]

• L1 accepts answer $\Leftrightarrow C \cdot x_i = A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$ for all i=1,2,...,t

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Problem: could post $C \neq A \cdot B$ along with $x_1 = x_2 = \cdots = x_n = \vec{0}$.

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• e.g., if n=256, set $x_i = h(C||i)$ for each i=1,2,...,t

- interpret output of hash function as a 0-1 vector

- for larger n, apply this idea to each "chunk" of 256 coordinates

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- e.g., if n=256, set $x_i = h(C||i)$ for each i=1,2,...,t (e.g., t=128)
- assuming h acts like a random function, would need $\approx 2^t$ attempts to find a matrix $C \neq A \cdot B$ with $C \cdot x_i = A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$ for all i=1,2,...,t

- "computational soundness" (i.e., infeasible to produce false proof)

Idea: post C along with $x_1, x_2, ..., x_t$. [assume L1 knows A and B]

- L1 accepts answer $\Leftrightarrow C \cdot x_i = A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$ for all i=1,2,...,t

– need to somehow ensure that the x_i 's are (as good as) random

Fiat-Shamir heuristic: derive the x_i 's from the outputs of a cryptographic hash function h (e.g., h = SHA-256).

- e.g., if n=256, set $x_i = h(C||i)$ for each i=1,2,...,t (e.g., t=128)
- assuming h acts like a random function, would need $\approx 2^t$ attempts to find a matrix $C \neq A \cdot B$ with $C \cdot x_i = A \cdot (B \cdot x_i)$ for all i=1,2,...,t
 - "computational soundness" (i.e., infeasible to produce false proof)
 - question: what goes wrong if instead set $x_i = h(i)$ for all i? ⁶⁵

Recap

- - size = $O(n^2)$ [size of the answer]
 - proof verification = $O(n^2)$ time [thinking of t as constant]
 - perfect completeness [correct answers always successfully verify]
 - computational soundness [computationally infeasible to find false proofs]

Recap

- Freivalds' algorithm + Fiat-Shamir heuristic -> proofs of matrix multiplication such that:
 - size = $O(n^2)$ [size of the answer]
 - proof verification = $O(n^2)$ time [thinking of t as constant]
 - perfect completeness [correct answers always successfully verify]
 - computational soundness [computationally infeasible to find false proofs]
- for validity rollups, need:
 - verification of arbitrary computation (not just matrix multiplication)

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 - proof verification = $O(n^2)$ time [thinking of t as constant]
 - perfect completeness [correct answers always successfully verify]
 - computational soundness [computationally infeasible to find false proofs]
- for validity rollups, need:
 - verification of arbitrary computation (not just matrix multiplication)
 - short proofs that can be posted to an L1 (along with state commitment)
 - i.e., "SNARKs" (see next lecture)