• Computer Science and Game Theory: A Conversation, School of Mathematics Public Lecture, Institute for Advanced Study (November 19, 2025).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis: An Introduction and a Case Study in Online Learning, School of Mathematics Members Colloquium, Institute for Advanced Study (November 17, 2025).
• Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance, AFT '25 (October 9, 2025).
• Quantifying Adverse Selection Costs in Automated Market Makers, Fields Medal Symposium in Honor of Mark Braverman (September 23, 2025).
• Shill-Proof Auctions, Virtual Seminars in Economic Theory (May 29, 2025).
• Slashing: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, Solana Accelerate: Scale or Die (May 20, 2025).
• Accountable Liveness, Yale Blockchain Symposium (April 11, 2025).
• Blockchain Protocols and Web3: A Glimpse Under the Hood (January 5, 2025).

• Mental Models for Blockchain Protocols and Web3 (December 2, 2024).
• The Computer in the Sky, UC Berkeley (November 20, 2024).
• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, panel at the CBER Crafting the Cryptoeconomy Conference (October 26, 2024).
• State of web3 research (with the a16z crypto research team), CSX @ a16z crypto (September 17, 2024).
• How Blockchain Tech Advances Benefit Other Industries (with Dan Boneh and Sonal Chokshi), web3 with a16z podcast (September 13, 2024).
• Robust Restaking Networks, Science and Engineering of Consensus (August 6, 2024).
• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, EC '24 (July 10, 2024).
• MEV, Blockspace Allocation and Tullock Contests, keynote at the EC '24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance (July 8, 2024).
• Automated Market Makers and Loss-versus-Reblanacing (LVR): A Deep Dive into Decentralized Finance, EC '24 tutorial (June 26, 2024).
• The Computer in the Sky, keynote at STOC '24 (June 25, 2024).
• Mathematical Foundations for a Computer in the Sky, Toyota Technology Institute at Chicago (May 20, 2024).
• The Computer in the Sky, Strachey Lecture, University of Oxford (April 30, 2024).
• Conversation on incentives (with Scott Kominers and Pranav Garimidi), CSX @ a16z crypto (April 18, 2024).
• LVR in a minute, a16z crypto (March 15, 2024).
• The Computer in Sky (March 7, 2024).
• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, keynote at FC '24 (March 4, 2024).
• Mathematical Foundations for a Computer in the Sky, Duke University (January 29, 2024).
• OnChain with Sirer Podcast (January 12, 2024).

• The Inkblot That Is Web3, keynote at the Lionhack '23 conference (April 14, 2023).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: Case Study in Blockchains/Web3, University of Waterloo (March 1, 2023).

• 8 Reasons Why Mechanism Design for Blockchains Is Hard (and Fascinating), keynote at the First Columbia Cryptoeconomics Workshop (December 1, 2022).
• Cryptoeconomics, Token Design, and Incentives in DeFi, Decentralized Finance MOOC (November 8, 2022).
• On Some Results and Challenges in Cryptoeconomics, Crypto Economics Security Conference (November 1, 2022).
• LVR, Ledgerfest (September 23, 2022).
• Ethereum, the Merge, and Beyond (with Tim Beiko, Sonal Chokshi, and Ali Yahya), web3 with a16z podcast (September 12, 2022).
• LVR: Loss versus Rebalancing, Science of Blockchains Conference (August 30, 2022).
• Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: Designs, Consensus, Attacks (with Sonal Chokshi and Valeria Nikolaenko), web3 with a16z podcast (August 29, 2022).
• Economics and Computation in Blockchains/Web3, keynote at EC '22 (July 13, 2022).
• Fireside chat (hosted by Juan Benet), Funding the Commons (June 24, 2022).
• Auction Design for Web3 (with Sonal Chokshi and Scott Kominers), web3 with a16z podcast (June 14, 2022).
• Blockchains / Crypto / Web3 (with Sonal Chokshi, Chris Dixon, and Ali Yahya), web3 with a16z podcast (May 31, 2022).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: The Case of Blockchains/Web3, Simons Institute 10th Anniversary Symposium (May 25, 2022).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: Case Study in Blockchains/Web3, Carnegie Mellon University (May 2, 2022).
• Mechanism Design for Ethereum and Beyond, ETHconomics @ DevConnect (April 21, 2022).
• Talking About Talking About Web3, keynote at the Lionhack '22 conference (April 1, 2022).
• Aggregating Conflicting Forecasts, Simons Institute Workshop on Learning in the Presence of Strategic Behavior (March 30, 2022).
• Permissionless Consensus, keynote at ICDCN '22 (January 6, 2022).

• A Theory of DeFi?, eynote at the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (November 19, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research (CBER) Forum (October 7, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechansim Design EC '21 (July 22, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (July 8, 2021).
• Policy Punchline Podcost (July 8, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, UCL Information Security Research Seminar (May 20, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Theory and Practice of Blockchains Seminar (May 19, 2021).
• EIP-1559 --- Tackling the Gas Fee Problem on Ethereum, Epicenter Podcast (May 10, 2021).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, IGAFIT Algorithmic Colloquium (March 25, 2021).
• Data-Driven Algorithm Design, The Institute for Emerging CORE Methods in Data Science (March 18, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Israeli Algorithmic Game Theory Seminar (March 2, 2021).

• An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 (and Q+A with Vitalik Buterin), Silicon Valley Ethereum Meetup (December 23, 2020).
• Data-Driven Algorithm Design, STOC 2020 Workshop on Algorithms with Predictions (June 26, 2020).
• An Axiomatic Approach to Block Rewards, Science of Blockchains Conference (February 21, 2020).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, MIT LIDS Student Conference (January 30, 2020).

• Two Optimal Approximation Algorithms in Submodular Optimization, Princeton CS Theory Lunch (November 15, 2019).
• Teaching Backward, Columbia University Teaching Innovations Lunch (November 7, 2019).
• Incentive-Compatibility in Blockchains and Mining Pools, Simons Institute Workshop on Large-Scale Consensus and Blockchains (October 25, 2019).
• Barries to Near-Optimal Equilibria, 20 Years of the Price of Anarchy (July 4, 2019).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, interview with Communications of the ACM (February 22, 2019).
• Fair Division with Combinatorial Valuations, Israel Algorithmic Game Theory Day (February 3, 2019).

• The Price of Anarchy, CAST IT interview at University of Copenhagen (September 17, 2018).
• How Computer Science Informs Modern Auction Design, Simons Foundation Public Lecture (April 18, 2018).
• Game Theory Through the Computational Lens, College de France (January 23, 2018).

• Learning Near-Optimal Auctions: Statistical, Computational, and Strategic Challenges, keynote at WINE '17 (December 19, 2017).
• Game Theory Through the Computational Lens, Public Lecture at London School of Economics (November 30, 2017).
• Communication Complexity and Impossibility Results for Simple Auctions, 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory (July 6, 2017).
• The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare Guarantees for Simple Auctions, 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory (July 5, 2017).
• Three New Connections Between Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory, YoungEC Workshop, Tel Aviv (January 5, 2017).
• How Does Computer Science Inform Modern Auction Design?, Ninth Israel CS Theory Day (January 3, 2017).

• How Hard Is Inference for Structured Prediction?, Simons Institute Workshop on Learning, Algorithm Design and Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (November 18, 2016). Slides
• Application-Specific Algorithm Selection, Simons Institute Open Lecture (October 26, 2016). Slides
• Outposts Between Average- and Worst-Case Analysis: A Case Study in Auction Design, Simons Institute Workshop on Uncertainty in Computation (October 7, 2016). Slides
• Distribution-Free Models of Social and Information Networks, Simons Institute Workshop on Optimization and Decision-Making Under Uncertainty (September 21, 2016). Slides
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (Part 2), Algorithms and Uncertainty Boot Camp, Simons Institute (August 25, 2016). Slides
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (Part 1), Algorithms and Uncertainty Boot Camp, Simons Institute (August 25, 2016). Slides
• How Does Computer Science Inform Modern Auction Design?, IBM Almaden (August 9, 2016).
• Learning Near-Optimal Auctions and Heuristics, Northwestern University Quarterly Theory Workshop (March 7, 2016).

• From the Inside: Economics and Computation, interview with Richard Karp at the Simons Institute (December 8, 2015).
• Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory: Some New Connections , TCS+ seminar (November 13, 2015). Slides
• The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions, Simons Institute Workshop on Complexity and Simplicity in Economics (October 19, 2015). Slides
• Near-Optimal Equilibria (Part 2) Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp (August 25, 2015).
• Near-Optimal Equilibria (Part 1) Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp (August 24, 2015).
• Two Applications of Learning Theory in Algorithmic Game Theory, keynote at COLT '15 (July 5, 2015). Slides
• Theoretical Computer Science: Predictions and Challenges, 50th Anniversary of the Stanford Computer Science Department (April 28, 2015).

• Equilibria, Computation, and Compromises, Lens of Computation on the Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study (November 22, 2014).
• Extension Theorems for the Price of Anarchy, Texas A & M Fish Bowl Seminar Series (April 11, 2013). Slides
• Intractability in Algorithmic Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Study (March 11, 2013). Slides
• Quantifying the Inefficiency of Game-Theoretic Equilibria, College de France (November 22, 2012).
• Simple Auctions with Near-Optimal Equilibria, Jerusalem Algorithmic Game Theory Workshop (May 26, 2011).
• Algorithmic Game Theory: Two Vignettes, Stanford Computer Systems Colloquium (March 11, 2009).
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, UC Irvine (January 24, 2009).
• Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, University of Maryland (April 22, 2005).

By Category

• How Does Computer Science Inform Modern Auction Design?, Ninth Israel CS Theory Day (January 3, 2017).
• How Does Computer Science Inform Modern Auction Design?, IBM Almaden (August 9, 2016).
• Algorithmic Game Theory: Two Vignettes, Stanford Computer Systems Colloquium (March 11, 2009).

• Shill-Proof Auctions, Virtual Seminars in Economic Theory (May 29, 2025).
• Aggregating Conflicting Forecasts, Simons Institute Workshop on Learning in the Presence of Strategic Behavior (March 30, 2022).
• Barries to Near-Optimal Equilibria, 20 Years of the Price of Anarchy (July 4, 2019).
• Fair Division with Combinatorial Valuations, Israel Algorithmic Game Theory Day (February 3, 2019).
• Learning Near-Optimal Auctions: Statistical, Computational, and Strategic Challenges, keynote at WINE '17 (December 19, 2017).
• Communication Complexity and Impossibility Results for Simple Auctions, 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory (July 6, 2017).
• The Price of Anarchy and Equilibrium Welfare Guarantees for Simple Auctions, 28th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory (July 5, 2017).
• Three New Connections Between Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory, YoungEC Workshop, Tel Aviv (January 5, 2017).
• Complexity Theory and Algorithmic Game Theory: Some New Connections , TCS+ seminar (November 13, 2015). Slides
• The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions, Simons Institute Workshop on Complexity and Simplicity in Economics (October 19, 2015). Slides
• Near-Optimal Equilibria (Part 2) Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp (August 25, 2015).
• Near-Optimal Equilibria (Part 1) Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp (August 24, 2015).
• Two Applications of Learning Theory in Algorithmic Game Theory, keynote at COLT '15 (July 5, 2015). Slides
• Extension Theorems for the Price of Anarchy, Texas A & M Fish Bowl Seminar Series (April 11, 2013). Slides
• Intractability in Algorithmic Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Study (March 11, 2013). Slides
• Simple Auctions with Near-Optimal Equilibria, Jerusalem Algorithmic Game Theory Workshop (May 26, 2011).
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, UC Irvine (January 24, 2009).
• Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, University of Maryland (April 22, 2005).

• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis: An Introduction and a Case Study in Online Learning, School of Mathematics Members Colloquium, Institute for Advanced Study (November 17, 2025).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, IGAFIT Algorithmic Colloquium (March 25, 2021).
• Data-Driven Algorithm Design, The Institute for Emerging CORE Methods in Data Science (March 18, 2021).
• Data-Driven Algorithm Design, STOC 2020 Workshop on Algorithms with Predictions (June 26, 2020).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, MIT LIDS Student Conference (January 30, 2020).
• How Hard Is Inference for Structured Prediction?, Simons Institute Workshop on Learning, Algorithm Design and Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (November 18, 2016). Slides
• Outposts Between Average- and Worst-Case Analysis: A Case Study in Auction Design, Simons Institute Workshop on Uncertainty in Computation (October 7, 2016). Slides
• Distribution-Free Models of Social and Information Networks, Simons Institute Workshop on Optimization and Decision-Making Under Uncertainty (September 21, 2016). Slides
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (Part 2), Algorithms and Uncertainty Boot Camp, Simons Institute (August 25, 2016). Slides
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis (Part 1), Algorithms and Uncertainty Boot Camp, Simons Institute (August 25, 2016). Slides
• Learning Near-Optimal Auctions and Heuristics, Northwestern University Quarterly Theory Workshop (March 7, 2016).

• Slashing: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, Solana Accelerate: Scale or Die (May 20, 2025).
• Blockchain Protocols and Web3: A Glimpse Under the Hood (January 5, 2025).
• Mental Models for Blockchain Protocols and Web3 (December 2, 2024).
• The Computer in Sky (March 7, 2024).
• The Inkblot That Is Web3, keynote at the Lionhack '23 conference (April 14, 2023).
• Cryptoeconomics, Token Design, and Incentives in DeFi, Decentralized Finance MOOC (November 8, 2022).
• LVR, Ledgerfest (September 23, 2022).
• Talking About Talking About Web3, keynote at the Lionhack '22 conference (April 1, 2022).

• Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance, AFT '25 (October 9, 2025).
• Quantifying Adverse Selection Costs in Automated Market Makers, Fields Medal Symposium in Honor of Mark Braverman (September 23, 2025).
• Accountable Liveness, Yale Blockchain Symposium (April 11, 2025).
• The Computer in the Sky, UC Berkeley (November 20, 2024).
• Robust Restaking Networks, Science and Engineering of Consensus (August 6, 2024).
• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, EC '24 (July 10, 2024).
• MEV, Blockspace Allocation and Tullock Contests, keynote at the EC '24 Workshop on Blockchains and Decentralized Finance (July 8, 2024).
• Automated Market Makers and Loss-versus-Reblanacing (LVR): A Deep Dive into Decentralized Finance, EC '24 tutorial (June 26, 2024).
• The Computer in the Sky, keynote at STOC '24 (June 25, 2024).
• Mathematical Foundations for a Computer in the Sky, Toyota Technology Institute at Chicago (May 20, 2024).
• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, keynote at FC '24 (March 4, 2024).
• Mathematical Foundations for a Computer in the Sky, Duke University (January 29, 2024).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: Case Study in Blockchains/Web3, University of Waterloo (March 1, 2023).
• 8 Reasons Why Mechanism Design for Blockchains Is Hard (and Fascinating), keynote at the First Columbia Cryptoeconomics Workshop (December 1, 2022).
• On Some Results and Challenges in Cryptoeconomics, Crypto Economics Security Conference (November 1, 2022).
• LVR: Loss versus Rebalancing, Science of Blockchains Conference (August 30, 2022).
• Economics and Computation in Blockchains/Web3, keynote at EC '22 (July 13, 2022).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: The Case of Blockchains/Web3, Simons Institute 10th Anniversary Symposium (May 25, 2022).
• The Long Arm of Theoretical Computer Science: Case Study in Blockchains/Web3, Carnegie Mellon University (May 2, 2022).
• Mechanism Design for Ethereum and Beyond, ETHconomics @ DevConnect (April 21, 2022).
• Permissionless Consensus, keynote at ICDCN '22 (January 6, 2022).
• A Theory of DeFi?, eynote at the 2021 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security (November 19, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Crypto and Blockchain Economics Research (CBER) Forum (October 7, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechansim Design EC '21 (July 22, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (July 8, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, UCL Information Security Research Seminar (May 20, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Theory and Practice of Blockchains Seminar (May 19, 2021).
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Israeli Algorithmic Game Theory Seminar (March 2, 2021).
• An Axiomatic Approach to Block Rewards, Science of Blockchains Conference (February 21, 2020).
• Incentive-Compatibility in Blockchains and Mining Pools, Simons Institute Workshop on Large-Scale Consensus and Blockchains (October 25, 2019).

• The Economic Limits of Permissionless Consensus, panel at the CBER Crafting the Cryptoeconomy Conference (October 26, 2024).
• State of web3 research (with the a16z crypto research team), CSX @ a16z crypto (September 17, 2024).
• How Blockchain Tech Advances Benefit Other Industries (with Dan Boneh and Sonal Chokshi), web3 with a16z podcast (September 13, 2024).
• OnChain with Sirer Podcast (January 12, 2024).
• Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: Designs, Consensus, Attacks (with Sonal Chokshi and Valeria Nikolaenko), web3 with a16z podcast (August 29, 2022).
• Fireside chat (hosted by Juan Benet), Funding the Commons (June 24, 2022).
• Conversation on incentives (with Scott Kominers and Pranav Garimidi), CSX @ a16z crypto (April 18, 2024).
• LVR in a minute, a16z crypto (March 15, 2024).
• Ethereum, the Merge, and Beyond (with Tim Beiko, Sonal Chokshi, and Ali Yahya), web3 with a16z podcast (September 12, 2022).
• Auction Design for Web3 (with Sonal Chokshi and Scott Kominers), web3 with a16z podcast (June 14, 2022).
• Blockchains / Crypto / Web3 (with Sonal Chokshi, Chris Dixon, and Ali Yahya), web3 with a16z podcast (May 31, 2022).
• Policy Punchline Podcost (July 8, 2021).
• EIP-1559 --- Tackling the Gas Fee Problem on Ethereum, Epicenter Podcast (May 10, 2021).
• Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, interview with Communications of the ACM (February 22, 2019).
• The Price of Anarchy, CAST IT interview at University of Copenhagen (September 17, 2018).
• From the Inside: Economics and Computation, interview with Richard Karp at the Simons Institute (December 8, 2015).

• Computer Science and Game Theory: A Conversation, School of Mathematics Public Lecture, Institute for Advanced Study (November 19, 2025).
• The Computer in the Sky, Strachey Lecture, University of Oxford (April 30, 2024).
• An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 (and Q+A with Vitalik Buterin), Silicon Valley Ethereum Meetup (December 23, 2020).
• How Computer Science Informs Modern Auction Design, Simons Foundation Public Lecture (April 18, 2018).
• Game Theory Through the Computational Lens, College de France (January 23, 2018).
• Game Theory Through the Computational Lens, Public Lecture at London School of Economics (November 30, 2017).
• Application-Specific Algorithm Selection, Simons Institute Open Lecture (October 26, 2016). Slides
• Equilibria, Computation, and Compromises, Lens of Computation on the Sciences, Institute for Advanced Study (November 22, 2014).
• Quantifying the Inefficiency of Game-Theoretic Equilibria, College de France (November 22, 2012).

• Two Optimal Approximation Algorithms in Submodular Optimization, Princeton CS Theory Lunch (November 15, 2019).
• Teaching Backward, Columbia University Teaching Innovations Lunch (November 7, 2019).
• Theoretical Computer Science: Predictions and Challenges, 50th Anniversary of the Stanford Computer Science Department (April 28, 2015).